With an unprecedented capability to store and process consumer information, fi rms today can tailor their pricing to individual consumers based on consumer preferences and past buying behaviors. In this chapter, we discuss this nascent practice of targeted pricing from a theoretical perspective. We focus on three main questions that are relevant to assessing the future of this practice. First, is targeted pricing benefi cial to practicing fi rms? Second, if a fi rm decides to embrace targeted pricing, what should be its targeting strategy in terms of whom to target and with what incentives? Third, is targeted pricing benefi cial to the society as a whole? We draw on the existing literature on targeted pricing to offer some preliminary answers to these questions.
Introduction
Targeted pricing, as the term is commonly used by practitioners, refers to the practice where a fi rm tailors its prices of a product to individual customers based on some discernible differences in their preferences, willingness to pay, buying behaviors, etc. For instance, when selling magazines, a publisher may decide to offer a discount to a new subscriber, but withhold the same discount from someone who has been a loyal subscriber for years. In the famous battle for market share between AT&T and MCI in the early 1990s, AT&T successfully persuaded many MCI customers to switch carriers by offering them personalized checks in the amounts of $25 to $100 depending on each consumer's long-distance calling history and experience with AT&T (Turco, 1993) . Today, many industries adopt some form of targeted pricing when they have actionable customer information, and such practices are also variably called 'one-to-one pricing', 'personalized pricing', 'tailored pricing', and sometimes 'dynamic pricing'.
On the surface, targeted pricing is nothing new and merely a form of price discrimination. The textbook defi nitions for different forms of price discrimination we use today came from the English economist Arthur C. Pigou (1877 Pigou ( -1959 . In his book Economics of Welfare, originally published in 1920, Pigou articulated three forms of price discrimination that a monopolist could implement. To use Pigou's words, However, targeted pricing as practiced in industries today frequently does not fi t any of these different forms of price discrimination. For instance, when amazon.com targets its loyal customers with a high price for a book, while charging a new, occasional purchaser a low price for the same, it implements a pricing scheme that cuts across all three forms of price discrimination and, arguably, goes beyond what has been understood to be the standard practices of price discrimination. First, amazon.com's pricing scheme is based primarily on past buying behaviors, rather than on any invariable 'practicable mark' such as gender, age and other demographics. Therefore this practice of targeted pricing is not exactly the third degree of price discrimination where customers with the same characteristics, say being students or senior citizens, are charged the same price. Second, it is not exactly the second degree of price discrimination, either, as both loyal and occasional purchasers are buying the same amount. In addition, it is amazon.com that is assigning a price to individual customers, and customers do not have a chance to self-select in terms of what they end up paying. Finally, this pricing practice is almost certainly not fi rstdegree price discrimination, as the pricing scheme does not tap into variations in willingness to pay that must exist among loyal as well as among occasional customers.
It is perhaps not surprising that a classifi cation scheme developed nearly a century ago can no longer encompass an ever-increasing number of different schemes of price discrimination concocted today by increasingly sophisticated practitioners. In the area of price discrimination, two market forces drive today's practitioners to become ever more inventive. First, the availability of new information technologies and sophisticated database analytics, and the widespread use of Internet transactions allow fi rms to gather and process detailed customer information on a large scale and in a timely and cost-effective manner. Consequently, fi rms are having ever-sharper pictures of individual customers so that they can move away from a labor-intensive targeting approach (Desai and Purohit, 2004) and go beyond static, obvious variables such as demographics and purchasing quantities in designing their price discrimination schemes. They can look into consumer preferences, loyalties and other psychographics, as well as geographic and other discernible and quantifi able differences among customers. Second, as the marketplace is becoming increasingly competitive, fi rms need to tune their pricing schemes constantly to stay ahead of competition when searching and capturing the last pockets of profi tability in the marketplace. 1 The proliferation of targeted pricing practices challenges not only the standard taxonomy of price discrimination, but also much of the conventional wisdom about price discrimination. One such piece of conventional wisdom is that price discrimination should always benefi t the practicing fi rm whether it implements fi rst-, second-or thirddegree price discrimination. After all, a fi rm, by being a monopoly, has the choice not to implement any price discrimination. However, in today's market environment, this logic is no longer valid, and certainly not in the industries where we frequently observe targeted pricing. For example, in the case of AT&T mentioned above, competition is a driving force behind its practice of targeted pricing. Indeed, AT&T's primary targets for its switching checks were MCI's customers. Armed with customer usage information in 1 Of course, even with conventional price discrimination schemes, competition intensity in a market plays an important role, as shown in Desai (2001). addition to customer addresses and demographics, AT&T could identify the switchable customers who were served by MCI and gauge the strength of their preferences for MCI to determine the right incentives required to induce them to switch. In this case, price discrimination was implemented based on consumer relative preferences. In addition, targeted pricing did not and could not take place in an insulated market where AT&T could ignore any competitive reactions. As a matter of fact, MCI implemented its own targeted pricing campaign to switch AT&T's customers, too. As a result of competitive targeted pricing, millions of customers switched (perhaps multiple times) between the two fi rms as they cashed the switching checks received from both fi rms.
In this new reality of price discrimination, three fundamental questions arise that are of interest to practitioners and marketing scholars alike. First, can fi rms benefi t from targeted pricing in oligopolistic markets? Many practitioners and experts may be tempted to offer a quick 'yes'. However, the answer is not that obvious, considering the complexity involved in implementing targeted pricing in terms of costs, competitive reactions and consumer responses. Yet the answer to this question gives us a perspective to guide the practice of targeted pricing and to assess its future. For instance, if fi rms become worse off because of targeted pricing, they may not have much incentive to invest in their targeting capability or they may want to seek ways to restrain targeted pricing in their industry. The answer to this question also offers some strategic prescriptions as to whether a fi rm should adopt targeted pricing and how it should prepare itself for such a future.
Second, if a fi rm decides to implement targeted pricing, what should be its targeting strategy? In other words, if a fi rm can identify consumers and charge different prices to different consumers, how should it deploy its capabilities? More concretely, should the fi rm target its competitor's customers with a discount, its own customers, or both? Our answer to this question can help us to understand the current practice of targeted pricing and offer some strategic guidance to practitioners.
Third, does targeted pricing improve social welfare? Marketers need to pay attention to this question because welfare implications do have regulatory implications, and our answer to this question may affect the legal environment in which targeted pricing is conducted.
In this chapter, we take a brief tour of the recent literature on targeted pricing to see how it answers those three questions. Before we start on that tour, three points are worth noting. First, targeted pricing is a nascent practice. Few data are available that can help us to address those three questions. For that reason, empirical research on targeted pricing mostly focuses on how a fi rm can or should implement targeted pricing given that it has a certain kind of customer information (Rossi and Allenby, 1993; Rossi et al., 1996; Dong et al., 2006; and Zhang and Wedel, 2007) . Theoretical research, in contrast, is uniquely suited for addressing all three questions in a competitive context. Therefore, in this chapter, we focus exclusively on the theoretical literature on targeted pricing.
Second, targeted pricing is an evolving practice, and new ways to implement targeted pricing emerge all the time. Therefore it is infeasible and perhaps even unwise to try to catalog all of the existent practices. The theoretical literature on targeted pricing so far mostly focuses on preference-based and behavior-based targeted pricing and we shall do the same in this chapter. Third, most of the theoretical studies on targeted pricing are fairly complex technically. Such technical complexity has sometimes rendered the literature inaccessible to a broad audience. Therefore, in our opinion it is desirable to discuss the messages of the literature without being unduly encumbered by technicalities.
Towards that objective, we shall use simplifi ed models instead of the original models, whenever possible, to illustrate the basic economics behind the main conclusions of this literature. In what follows, we take up each of the three questions in turn.
Would fi rms benefi t from targeted pricing?
The simple answer to this question is 'it depends'! That is, of course, the easy part of the answer. The difficult part is to fi gure out what it depends on. Many researchers, such as Thisse and Vives (1988) , Shaffer and Zhang (1995) , Bester and Petrakis (1996) , Chen (1997) , Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) , and Taylor (2003) , have investigated this question with different models. We can use a simple model to capture the gist of their arguments.
In any market where targeted pricing is implemented, consumers must be heterogeneous in their preferences and fi rms must be selling a differentiated product. We can use the standard Hotelling (1929) model to capture both market conditions. Concretely, consider two fi rms located respectively at 0 and 1 of a unit Hotelling line and set their prices independently. For simplicity, we assume away all production costs. Consumers in the market are uniformly distributed along the unit line and we normalize the number of consumers to one, so we do not need to carry a constant around in our computations. To follow convention, we further assume that each consumer in the market makes at most only a single unit purchase if such a purchase generates positive surplus.
Before a consumer makes a purchase, she will compare the surplus she would get from Firm 1 with that from Firm 2, and choose the fi rm that provides the most surplus. To make the choice decision more concrete, let V stand for the reservation price that consumers are willing to pay for their 'ideal' product and let t denote the unit transportation cost that a consumer must incur to purchase a non-ideal product. Then, for a consumer located at x [ [0, 1], if she purchases from Firm 1 at the price p 1 , the surplus she obtains is V 2 p 1 2 tx. If she purchases from Firm 2 at the price p 2 , her surplus is V 2 p 2 2 t(1 2 x). Thus, depending on the location x, even if both fi rms charge the same price to a consumer, the consumer will have a defi nite preference in terms of where she prefers to make the purchase -she will purchase the product that is closer to her ideal product. This preference heterogeneity gives rise to the possibility of using targeted pricing to compete for customers.
To isolate the effect of targeted pricing, let us fi rst establish the benchmark of uniform pricing where each fi rm can only charge one price to all consumers. In this case, we can easily identify the location of marginal consumers x | such that to the left of x | , all consumers purchase from Firm 1 and, to the right, all consumers purchase from Firm 2. From
Then it is easy to write down each fi rm's payoff function and they are, respectively, p 1 5 p 1 x and p 2 5 p 2 (1 2 x | ). As each fi rm sets its price to maximize its payoffs, we can derive the equilibrium prices and profi ts from the fi rst-order conditions and they are, respectively, p 1 5 p 2 5 t and p 1 5 p 2 5 t/2. The equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 14 .1. In this equilibrium of uniform pricing, the two competing fi rms share the market equally, i.e. x | 5 1 2 . A fi rm has no incentive to price more aggressively to gain a larger market share in this case because by cutting its price to lure marginal consumers away from the competition, the fi rm also cuts its price to all consumers who would have purchased from the fi rm without the price cut. In other words, without the fl exibility of charging different customers at different locations a different price, a fi rm must leave more money on the table for those non-marginal customers in order to generate more incremental sales. However, targeted pricing gets a fi rm out of that bind and gives it the needed fl exibility.
To see this, suppose that Firm 1 suddenly gains the capability of implementing targeted pricing in the sense that it can set location-specifi c prices p 1 (x) for all x [ [0, 1], but Firm 2 cannot. In this case, in any equilibrium, there still exists an x | such that all consumers located to the right of x | will purchase from Firm 2 and to the left from Firm 1. Then, at x | , given that Firm 1 can charge a location-specifi c price p 1 (x | ), it must be the case that Firm 1 sets p 1 (x | ) 5 0, which is Firm 1's marginal cost. Otherwise, Firm 1 can always lower its p 1 (x | ) slightly to secure the patronage of the consumers located at x | and increase its profi t. This means that for any given p 2 , we can obtain the location of the marginal consumers for this case of unilateral targeting by replacing p 1 in equation (14.1) with 0, i.e. x | 5 (p 2 1t)/2t.
To determine Firm 1's prices for consumers located at x < x | , we note that Firm 1 has no incentives to offer to anyone a price that is lower than what is needed to make a consumer indifferent between buying from Firm 1 and from Firm 2. In other words, the equilib-
Therefore, we should have in equilibrium
Firm 1's payoff is then given by p 1 5 e x 0 p 1 (x)dx and Firm 2's payoff by p 2 5 p 2 (1 2 x | ).
By taking the fi rst-order condition with respect to Firm 2's payoff, 2 we can easily 2 Here, we follow the example in Thisse and Vives (1988) to treat Firm 1 as a price follower when it implements targeted pricing because of its pricing fl exibility. 
Figure 14.1 Equilibrium prices and market share
Competitive targeted pricing 307 determine the optimal price for Firm 2 and hence the optimal pricing schedule for Firm 1. We illustrate this equilibrium of unilateral targeting in Figure 14 .1(a). In this equilibrium of unilateral targeted pricing, Firm 1 is better off, with its profi t increasing from t/2 in the case of uniform pricing to 9 16 t. From Figure 14 .1(a), we can see that Firm 1 is better off for two reasons. First, Firm 1 can tailor its prices to customers based on their strength of preference, offering varying discounts to those who have progressively stronger preferences for Firm 2. This fl exibility in pricing helps Firm 1 to increase its market share from 1 2 to 3 4 (see Figure 14 .1a). This is 'the market share effect'. Second, Firm 1 can also charge progressively higher prices to those who have progressively stronger preferences for its own product. This is 'the price discrimination effect'. Because of these two effects, most practitioners and experts have intuitively come to the conclusion that targeted pricing will always benefi t the practicing fi rm.
However, this need not be the case. In Figure 14 .1(a), we get a hint as to why a practicing fi rm may not benefi t in a competitive context. When both fi rms adopts uniform pricing, they each set their price at t. However, when Firm 1 has the capability of deploying targeted pricing, Firm 2 responds by lowering its price from t to t/2 in an effort to counter the threat of targeted pricing from Firm 1. In other words, targeted pricing can potentially trigger more intense price competition. We can see this 'price competition effect' more clearly if we also allow Firm 2 to implement targeted pricing so that we have competitive targeted pricing in the market.
When both fi rms can set a location-specifi c pricing schedule, respectively p 1 (x) and p 2 (x), we can follow the similar steps as in the case of unilateral targeted pricing to derive the equilibrium pricing schedules, which are given below and illustrated in Figure  14 .1(b).
In this equilibrium, the market share effect disappears, as the competing fi rms share the market equally (see Figure 14 .1(b)). The price discrimination effect is still present, as we can see from the above pricing schedules. However, it is not strong enough to outweigh the price competition effect. This is refl ected in the fact that both fi rms' pricing schedules are uniformly below t, the price that both fi rms set in the benchmark case of no targeted pricing. As a result, both fi rms are worse off with a lower profi t of t/4. The fact that competitive targeted pricing could make practicing fi rms worse off is perhaps not very surprising in hindsight. As pointed out by Corts (1998, p. 321) , 'Competitive price discrimination may intensify competition by giving fi rms more weapons with which to wage their war.' When competing fi rms all have the fl exibility of targeted pricing, they can target each other's customers with great accuracy and efficiency, and they will all have to compete for each individual customer in the market. For that reason, the intensity of price competition increases to the detriment of both fi rms. Also for that reason, the early studies on competitive targeted pricing, such as Thisse and Vives (1988) , Shaffer and Zhang (1995) , Bester and Petrakis (1996) , Chen (1997) , Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) , and Taylor (2003) , have all come to the same conclusion, in varying institutional contexts and with different models, that competitive targeted pricing will make practicing fi rms worse off.
This conclusion, of course, does not bode well for the future of targeted pricing. However, some refl ection based on the analysis we have conducted so far tells us that this conclusion is not inevitable. This is because even if the fl exibility compels fi rms to wrestle each other for each customer in the market, it does not give all fi rms an equal chance to win each wrestling match. In fact, if a fi rm is a 'Sumo wrestler' to start with, the fl exibility may give it a chance to wrestle for each customer and win each customer, too. In that asymmetrical case, the market share effect can be enhanced and the price discrimination effect can be amplifi ed so that the Sumo wrestler can be better off with targeted pricing than without. Then the question is what kind of fi rms might be Sumo wrestlers? Shaffer and Zhang (2002) address that question.
To illustrate the argument in that article, consider the following simple model where Firm 1 sells a high-quality product and Firm 2 sells a low-quality product. Suppose that all consumers are willing to pay V for a low-quality product, but V 1 u for the highquality product, where u [ [0, 1] follows a uniform distribution. In other words, the willingness to pay for the low-quality product is constant, but that for the high-quality product varies among consumers. For simplicity, we still maintain the assumption that all costs are zero. Thus, if both high-and low-quality fi rms charge a single price, respectively p l and p h , we must have the payoff functions for both fi rms given respectively by p l 5 p l (p h 2 p l ) and p h 5 p h (1 2 p h 1 p l ). From fi rst-order conditions, we can easily determine equilibrium prices and profi ts. They are p l 5 . In this equilibrium, the high-quality fi rm gets two-thirds of the market and the low quality fi rm one-third. Now imagine that both fi rms can costlessly implement targeted pricing. In this case, it is easy to see that in equilibrium the high-quality fi rm can corner all consumers by charging u, the premium that a consumer is willing to pay for a high-quality product. The low-quality fi rm will charge zero (the marginal cost) to all consumers, but sell to none. Here, the low-quality fi rm makes zero profi t under competitive targeted pricing and the high-quality fi rm's profi t is p h 5 1 2 . 4 9 . The high-quality fi rm is the Sumo wrestler! The model used in Shaffer and Zhang (2002) is more general than this simple model suggests, and it incorporates the four main features of targeted pricing: individual addressability, personalized incentives, competition and costs of targeting (Blattberg and Deighton, 1991; Schultz, 1994) . The model also allows customers to be loyal to different fi rms in a competitive context and introduces differences in the size of customer groups loyal to the respective fi rms.
Their analysis shows that a fi rm can benefi t from competitive targeting after all, even if all consumers are perfectly addressable. The fi rm that commands a larger loyal following, i.e. that has more customers who are willing to pay a premium for its product, will be the one that benefi ts. This is because under competitive targeted pricing, a fi rm's expected payoff from consumers who are contested by competing fi rms comes only from the loyalty that these consumers have for the fi rm's brand. Although a fi rm is always able to outbid its competitor for the consumers who prefer its brand, targeted pricing dissipates all potential rents except for the premiums that contested consumers are willing to pay for a brand. Therefore, in an information-intensive marketing environment where a fi rm's customers are not anonymous to competition, the last line of defense in a fi rm's battle to acquire or retain a customer is the customers' relative preference for the fi rm.
In this context, one can readily appreciate the vital importance of individual (rather than average) consumer loyalty in the information age and hence the need for a fi rm to invest in enhancing consumer brand loyalty through quality, relationship, satisfaction, one-toone marketing etc.
More recently, Liu and Zhang (2006) have shown that in a channel context, manufacturers are typically such Sumo wrestlers if they are in a position to dictate the wholesale prices for retailers. This is because, without targeted pricing at the retail level, a retailer can always commit to a single price markup and leverage the market coverage to get the manufacturer to charge a low wholesale price. In other words, the retailer can credibly threaten to raise its retail price to all end users automatically and sell to far fewer customers if the manufacturer charges a high wholesale price. To alleviate 'the double marginalization problem', the manufacturer will not charge too high a wholesale price. However, with the ability to implement targeted pricing at the retail level, the retailer loses such a leverage somewhat, as it will use variable markups to sell to end users. This means that the manufacturer can raise its wholesale price without worrying too much about worsening the double marginalization problem.
Of course, the existence of a Sumo wrestler, or asymmetry in competition, is a more obvious situation where a fi rm can benefi t from competitive targeted pricing. A tougher question to answer is, whether in a situation where competing fi rms are equally matched and they all implement targeted pricing, can any of them become better off? This is a situation where the early literature has shown that the market share effect of targeted pricing disappears and the price competition effect dominates. More recently, however, Chen et al. (2001) have concluded that a fi rm, indeed all competing fi rms, can become better off in that situation. Chen et al. (2001) note that targeted pricing in practice is imperfect in that competing fi rms can never distinguish different types of customers in a market with certitude.
3 For instance, a fi rm's own loyal customer may be mistaken for a switcher because of a fi rm's imperfect targetability. When fi rms compete with imperfect targetability, what they term the 'mistargeting effect' will be at work, which can help to moderate price competition to the benefi t of all competing fi rms. More concretely, fi rms always want to charge a high price to price-insensitive loyal customers and a low price to price-sensitive switchers. Due to imperfect targetability, each fi rm will mistakenly classify some price-sensitive switchers as price-insensitive loyal customers and charge them all a high price. These misclassifi cations thus allow its competitors to acquire those mistargeted customers without lowering their prices and, hence, reduce the rival fi rm's incentive to cut prices. This effect softens price competition in the market, which benefi ts all competing fi rms. Of course, the magnitude of this effect will depend on targetability, and at a sufficiently high targetability, say perfect targetability, this effect can be weakened to the extent that neither fi rm can benefi t from competitive targeted pricing.
Thus this study narrows down the conditions under which competing fi rms cannot benefi t from competitive targeted pricing. There are two: fi rm symmetry and (sufficiently) high targetability. In addition, the article points out that imperfect targetability also qualitatively changes the incentive environment for competing fi rms engaging in targeted pricing. For instance, superior knowledge of individual customers can be a competitive advantage, but competing fi rms may all benefi t from exchanging individual customer information with each other at the nascent stage of targeted pricing when fi rms' targetability is low. Indeed, under certain circumstances, a fi rm may even fi nd it profi table to give away this information unilaterally. In terms of competitive dynamics, Chen et al. (2001) suggest that competitive targeted pricing does not doom small fi rms. In fact, targeted pricing may provide a good opportunity for a small fi rm to leapfrog a large fi rm. The key to leapfrogging is a high level of targetability or customer knowledge. In other words, small fi rms can also become the Sumo wrestler if they manage to gain a high level of targetability fi rst.
The literature has also looked into behavior-based targeted pricing. When consumers with varying brand preferences are all passive recipients of a targeted price and they do not react when a fi rm takes away their surplus, fi rms can understandably become better off. However, when more and more consumers become aware of the practice of targeted pricing, many of them will start to react to the practice and behave strategically (Feinberg et al., 2002) . For instance, a price-insensitive customer may fake being a price-sensitive customer by refusing to pay a high price. In that case, could targeted pricing still benefi t a practicing fi rm? Villas-Boas (2004) offers an intriguing answer to that question. Villas-Boas (2004) shows that if a fi rm targets a consumer based on the consumer's past buying behavior and the consumer knows about it, the consumer may start to behave strategically: choosing to forego a purchase today to avoid being recognized as a priceinsensitive customer and hence to avail herself of a low price targeted at new buyers. Such strategic waiting on the part of consumers can hurt a fi rm both through reducing the benefi t of price discrimination and through foregone sales. As a result, even a monopoly cannot benefi t from targeted pricing.
4 A more recent study by Acquisti and Varian (2005) has come to a similar conclusion from the perspective of the revelation mechanism design, showing that it is never profi table for a monopolist to condition its pricing on purchase history, unless a sufficient number of consumers are not sophisticated enough to see through the seller's targeting strategy or the fi rm can provide enhanced services to boost consumer valuation subsequent to a purchase. In a competitive context, however, a fi rm cannot benefi t from targeted pricing based on consumer purchase history at all.
Both studies have pointed to the difficulty in implementing price discrimination when consumers can anticipate future prices and make intertemporal adjustments. Without the benefi t of price discrimination, targeted pricing will most likely make a fi rm worse off. However, just as there are reasons to believe that the existence of rational, forwardlooking consumers can reduce the benefi t of targeted pricing, there are also reasons to believe that their existence may enhance that benefi t, too. For instance, in a two-period game, Fudenberg and Tirole (2000) show that a fi rm always has the incentive to offer discounts to the rival fi rm's customers who have revealed, through their prior purchase, their preference for the rival fi rm's product. In other words, once a fi rm fi gures out who is buying from whom, the fi rm always has an incentive to poach the rival's customers with a low price. Anticipating such a poaching discount, consumers should become less price 4 In an earlier paper, Villas-Boas (1999) also shows that competing fi rms can all be worse off. sensitive when they make their initial purchases, and this demand-driven effect should help to sustain high initial prices in the market. These high initial prices in turn should benefi t competing fi rms.
On the supply side, the pursuit of targeted pricing can also generate some strategic benefi ts. In practice, fi rms frequently need to 'experiment' with their prices in order to gauge customer price sensitivities. A long stream of research on price experimentation shows that a fi rm may optimally experiment with its pricing decision at the cost of its current profi t in order to enhance the informativeness of the observed market demand, and such information can help the fi rm to increase its future profi t (Kihlstrom et al., 1984; Mirman et al., 1993) . Interestingly, Mirman et al. (1994) subsequently show that such information always helps a monopolist, but may be detrimental to competing fi rms. Chen and Zhang (forthcoming) have recently extended the analysis to the case where fi rms may experiment with their prices not to gauge an uncertain market demand more accurately but to recognize the individual segments of a certain market demand for the purpose of implementing targeted pricing. Chen and Zhang (forthcoming) show that the pursuit of customer recognition by competing fi rms based on consumer purchase history can moderate price competition in a market. This is because, as a fi rm strives to glean more accurate, actionable customer information for subsequent targeted pricing, it must seek to sell to a small number of customers, or to achieve 'exclusivity'. Exclusivity can come only with a high price, relative to the rival's price, such that not all consumers will purchase from the fi rm. Consequently, the fi rm has a strategic incentive to raise its price in its pursuit of customer recognition and price discrimination, to the benefi t of all competing fi rms. In fact, Chen and Zhang (forthcoming) show that, paradoxically, a monopolist can become worse off because of the fi rm's quest for customer recognition, similar to Villas-Boas (1999), but competing fi rms can all become better off when they all actively pursue customer recognition. This is because competition amplifi es what they term as 'the price-for-information' effect, as with competition the rise in one fi rm's price will, in turn, induce the increase in the rival's price and vice versa.
From all these discussions, we can draw one clear conclusion about targeted pricing: fi rms do not automatically benefi t from this practice. There are mitigating factors, such as competition, strategic customers and mature markets that would prevent a fi rm from benefi ting from this fl exible, competitive form of price discrimination. Only those fi rms that command customer loyalty through product quality, branding, service, relationship marketing etc., and those that have an information advantage, are positioned to reap the benefi ts of targeted pricing.
What is the optimal targeting strategy?
To benefi t from targeted pricing, a fi rm must target the right customers with the right incentives. Who are the right customers to target with discounts: a fi rm's own customers or the competition's? The literature has shed a good deal of light on this question.
Intuitively, to any fi rm, the customers who are currently buying from the competition are those who will deliver incremental sales if they are switched over. Therefore a fi rm should generate most incremental sales and get the most bang out of its discount dollars if it targets the competition's customers. It turns out that poaching with targeted pricing or the strategy of 'paying customers to switch' can be the optimal strategy in a competitive equilibrium (Shaffer and Zhang, 1995; Chen, 1997; Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000) . This is perhaps why magazines offer new subscribers' discounts, and why AT&T and MCI target each other's customers with switching checks.
However, some refl ection here should reveal that this strategy cannot be optimal all the time or for all fi rms. For instance, MCI may very well benefi t from poaching AT&T's customers, as AT&T had a bigger market share and hence more (marginal) customers to lose, but why should AT&T follow the same strategy by poaching MCI's customers? Doesn't it make more sense for AT&T to adopt the strategy of 'paying customers to stay'? Shaffer and Zhang (2000) develop a model where consumers differ in their preferences and competing fi rms have different installed customer bases. In this model, fi rms cannot target individual customers, but only their own or the competition's customer base. From the analysis of this model, they come to the conclusion that the benefi ts of 'paying customers to switch' do not carry over to markets where competing fi rms are not equally matched. When fi rms are asymmetric, it can be optimal for a fi rm to use the strategy of 'paying customers to stay', but surprisingly the identity of this fi rm cannot be determined by fi rm size alone. Either the smaller fi rm or the bigger fi rm, but not both, may fi nd it optimal to charge a lower price to its own customers. What determines a fi rm's targeting strategy is whether the fi rm's own customers are more price elastic than the rival's customers from the fi rm's own perspective.
To use the example in Shaffer and Zhang (2000, p. 413) to illustrate the point, suppose Pizza Hut and Domino's can both price-discriminate between own customers and the rival's customers. In this case, we might expect that for both fi rms, the customers located further away from a fi rm tend to be more price elastic and the customers located near a fi rm are more price inelastic. Then, regardless of its market share, each fi rm should pay customers to switch, poaching the customers on the competition's turf. On the other hand, suppose Domino's delivers, but Pizza Hut does not. Then, because Domino's delivers, customers close to Pizza Hut incur little cost to switch to Domino's, while the cost for Domino's customers (who live far from Pizza Hut) to switch to dining in at Pizza Hut is signifi cant, so that few of them will switch even when offered a substantial discount. In this case, Pizza Hut should pay customers to stay, while Domino's Pizza should pay customers to switch.
The analysis in Shaffer and Zhang (2000) also generates three additional insights into how a fi rm should implement its targeted pricing. First, the fi rm with the higher regular price should offer the larger discount (e.g. AT&T will offer a larger discount than MCI). Second, the fi rm with the higher regular price always pays customers to switch. In other words, if a fi rm's optimal pricing strategy is pay to stay, it must have the lower regular price, too. However, the converse is not true: depending on parameters, the fi rm with the lower regular price may either want to pay customers to switch (MCI's strategy) or pay customers to stay (Sprint's strategy). Third, if each fi rm offers a discount to the same consumer group, the fi rm that is paying customers to switch will have the higher discount. This partially refl ects the fact that it is more difficult to acquire the customers who prefer the rival's product in the fi rst place.
Of course, this clear division of own versus competition's customers loses much of its signifi cance when fi rms can identify and address each individual customer in the market and all consumers are potentially contested for by all competing fi rms. In that case, as shown in , fi rms need to pursue both offensive and defensive targeting simultaneously: they must offer well-tailored incentives to pay customers to stay as well as to switch.
Concretely, in situations where the targeting cost is quite signifi cant, fi rms should never target all consumers and they should only target consumers in a well-selected 'targeting zone' -the customers who can be profi tably contested. Furthermore, they should target both their own and their competitors' customers in the targeting zone with a certain amount of randomness. As targeting costs decrease, fi rms should move away from offensive targeting to defensive targeting. The reason is that, as costs decrease, a fi rm has an incentive to target more of the rival's customers. However, the more it does so, the more consumers with stronger loyalty to the rival's product are targeted, so that offensive targeting becomes less effective in switching these consumers. This explains why the intensity of a fi rm's offensive targeting should level off as the cost of targeting decreases. In contrast, as a fi rm's more loyal customers are exposed to the rival's targeting due to a lower targeting cost, the fi rm faces increasingly more incentives to retain these profi table customers through defensive targeting. For that reason, the intensity of defensive targeting should pick up as the cost of targeting decreases.
One side effect of broad targeting is this phenomenon of massive customer churn, where a large number of customers switch to a less-preferred product because of targeted discounts. Shaffer and Zhang (2000) provide a fresh perspective on this phenomenon and suggest that customer churn need not always cause undue alarm. This is because customer churn results from fi rms taking chances with their loyal customers in order to capture as much consumer surplus from them as possible. From this perspective, it should not be eliminated. In addition, enhancing consumer loyalty should not always lead to churn reduction. This is because a higher consumer loyalty should also give competing fi rms more incentives to take chances with their loyal customers. The optimal way to manage customer churn is to engage in more defensive targeting (e.g. loyalty programs) as the cost of targeting decreases.
The cost of targeting and the strength of consumer preferences are but two out of many parameters to which fi rms should pay attention in adjusting their offensive and defensive targeting strategies. In a recent article, Fruchter and Zhang (2004) develop a differential game of competitive targeted pricing and show that a fi rm's optimal targeting strategies, both offensive and defensive, depend on its actual market share, the relevant redemption rate of its targeted promotions, customer profi tability and the effectiveness of its targeted promotions. In the short run, a fi rm should operationalize its targeting strategies by adjusting its planned promotional incentives on the basis of the observed differences between actual and planned market shares, and between actual and planned redemption rates. In the long run, a focus on customer retention is not an optimal strategy for all fi rms in a competitive context. A fi rm with a sufficiently large market share should focus on customer retention (defensive targeting), whereas a fi rm with a sufficiently small market share should stress customer acquisition (offensive targeting). This is the case regardless of whether or not the fi rm is more effective in targeting its current customers. When market shares are more evenly divided, the optimal strategy for a fi rm is to focus more on customer acquisition than retention.
However, no matter how thoughtful and diligent a fi rm is in implementing its targeting strategy, it may still be doomed to fail if it ignores the customers' emotional reactions to targeted pricing. When more and more customers become aware of the practice of targeted pricing, a practicing fi rm cannot simply assume that consumers will calmly accept whatever price a fi rm imposes on them. Indeed, amazon.com learned the hard way, when it experimented in 2000 with using targeted pricing to sell DVDs and books, that 'Few things stir up a consumer revolt quicker than the notion that someone else is getting a better deal' (The Washington Post, 27 September 2000, p. A1). Amazon.com had a PR disaster on its hands when some consumers found out through Internet chat rooms and media reports that they were willfully subjected to higher prices than others who did not necessarily deserve a discount. Should a fi rm still use targeted pricing when consumers become aware ? Feinberg et al. (2002) look into that question.
Through experiments, Feinberg et al. show that consumers care about not only the prices they themselves have to pay, but also the prices other groups of potential purchasers pay at the same fi rm. As shown in Table 14 .1, by comparing statistical results for nested models, Feinberg et al. establish that targeted pricing in a competitive context can generate two behavioral effects among customers. First, 'consumers' preference for their favored fi rm will decrease if it offers a special price to switchers (the other fi rms present customers) and not to loyals (their own fi rm's present customers)'. Because of this, loyals are less likely to purchase from their favored fi rm. This is what they term as 'the betrayal effect', which has a sizable magnitude of 0.1241, as indicated in Table 14 .1. Second, 'Consumers' preference for their favored fi rm will decrease if another fi rm offers a special price to its own loyals.' This is 'the jealousy effect', which also tends to reduce the likelihood of consumers' purchases at their favored fi rm. The magnitude of this effect is comparable to that of the betrayal effect (0.1187). However, the presence of the two effects in the marketplace does not mean that a fi rm should never use targeted pricing. All it means is that a fi rm should think through its strategies carefully and take advantage of those effects when they are favorable and mitigate them when they are not. In general, this involves a fi rm recognizing these psychological effects and adjusting its targeting strategy from a more offensive-oriented to a more defensive-oriented strategy. This analysis was recently extended by the same authors to an environment of competitive price increase (Krishna et al., 2007) .
Does social welfare improve?
Many researchers have argued that targeted pricing can potentially harm social welfare (Shaffer and Zhang, 1995; Chen, 1997; Fudenberg and Tirole, 2000) . This is because targeted pricing can distort consumer choices and motivate consumers to buy products that are less preferred. By implication, regulatory interventions might be warranted. However, this line of reasoning works only when the market size is fi xed, fi rms do not make any other non-price adjustments because of targeted pricing, and strategic consumers do not exist in the market. In the real world, it would be difficult to fi nd a market where all three conditions are present.
When the size of a market is expandable, it is easy to see why social welfare may improve due to competitive targeted pricing. Targeted pricing will allow all competing fi rms to lower their prices to 'marginal consumers' who would otherwise not purchase from any fi rm. The increased sales will increase social welfare, as fi rms will never sell at a price below its marginal cost and consumers will never purchase a product that does not provide a positive surplus.
Even if the size of a market cannot expand, social welfare can still improve if competing fi rms make long-term adjustments, say changing their product locations to compete for customers. Lederer and Hurter (1986) investigate that possibility in an elegant, but rather involved, model. Here, we can use a much simpler model to illustrate that possibility.
Consider again the simple Hotelling model that we used in Section 2. Instead of assuming that two competing fi rms are located at the respective ends of the Hotelling line, we now assume that two fi rms can choose their respective locations a and b on the line, where 0 # a # b # 1, before they make their pricing decisions. In other words, fi rms know each other's locations before they make their respective pricing decisions. To make sure that for any pair of locations (a, b), the equilibrium exists for the pricing game, we further assume that consumer transportation cost is quadratic in the distance traveled. Thus, for a consumer located at x [ (a, b) , her utility from buying from Firm 1 and Firm 2 is given by V 2 p 1 2 t(x 2 a) 2 and V 2 p 2 2 t(b 2 x) 2 respectively. We shall maintain all other assumptions about the Hotelling model that we made in Section 2.
As D 'Aspremont et al. (1979) have shown, if the two fi rms are restricted to uniform pricing, each charging a single price, the fi rms will choose their product locations respectively at 0 and 1 in equilibrium. In other words, the competing fi rms want to follow 'the principle of maximum differentiation', maximally differentiating themselves to moderate price competition in the market. In equilibrium, the two fi rms share the market equally, with the indifferent customers being located at 1 2 , and they each charge a price of t. In this market, given that the total demand is fi xed, any change in social welfare will depend only on the total disutility (or the total transportation cost) that consumers in the market must suffer, which is 1 12 t. Now imagine that in this market both fi rms adopt targeted pricing. Then, for any pair of locations (a, b) , if the consumers located at x purchase from Firm 1, the price they are paying must be the premium they are willing to pay for Firm 1's product because of their location, which is the difference in transportation costs between traveling to Firm 1 and to Firm 2. Thus competitive targeted pricing introduces the incentives for a fi rm to minimize the costs for consumers to travel to the fi rm in its location decision, as doing so will allow the fi rm to charge higher prices subsequently. Then competing fi rms will choose their locations at 1 4 and 3 4 respectively, the locations that will minimize the total disutility in the market. At these socially optimal locations, the total disutility in the market is only 1 48 t and thus competitive targeted pricing improves social welfare by 3 48 t. Intuitively, competitive targeted pricing will expose all consumers to competition, and what each fi rm can charge will depend on how happy individual consumers are about a fi rm relative to its rival. Therefore fi rms will have to make customers happy to keep themselves profi table and hence comes social welfare improvement. Clearly, this source of social welfare improvement is generalizable to other situations and even to many other decisions that competing fi rms have to make. For instance, social welfare also improves by the same amount if fi rms were to pursue 'the principle of minimum differentiation' prior to the introduction of targeted pricing . It is also likely that because of competitive targeted pricing, a fi rm's service provisions (Armstrong and Vickers, 2001) , marketing expenditures, quality improvements, market entry etc. may also be at the socially optimal levels or close to them (Choudhary et al., 2005; Ghose and Huang, 2006; Serfes, 2004, 2005) .
Finally, as shown in Chen and Zhang (forthcoming) , the existence of strategic consumers in the market can also provide an opportunity for competitive targeted pricing to improve social welfare. This is because targeted pricing allows a fi rm to price-discriminate and hence to discourage strategic consumers from waiting for or foregoing purchases. As a result, sales increase even if no new customer enters the market.
Of course, there could be other reasons on the cost side or demand side as to why targeted pricing may or may not improve social welfare. However, the literature seems to suggest, on balance, that competitive targeted pricing is social welfare improving. At the minimum, there does not seem to be any solid economic ground at this point to call for any regulatory intervention in targeted pricing.
Conclusion
Competitive targeted pricing is a practice that is still evolving rapidly. The theoretical research in the past decade or so has generated some insightful perspectives, which allow us to peer into its future, notwithstanding the fact that the literature itself is also fast evolving. From these theoretical studies, we can perhaps draw three general conclusions about competitive targeted pricing.
First, the practice of targeted pricing has gone signifi cantly beyond the traditional concept of price discrimination. With new information technologies becoming available, practitioners are redefi ning what is feasible in price discrimination and they have broken out of the confi nes of traditional practices. Looking into the future, we should not be surprised to see more and more sophisticated, unconventional schemes in targeted pricing. Indeed, as we are marching further into the Information Age, only practitioners' creativity, information technologies and consumer privacy concerns can limit the popularity and varieties of targeted pricing.
Second, unlike the conventional practices of price discrimination where the fi rm is thought always to benefi t, competitive targeted pricing does not always benefi t practicing fi rms. The reason is that better customer targeting by competing fi rms exposes more consumers to competition. As a result, consumers may all benefi t from competitive targeted pricing and social welfare may also improve.
Third, perhaps most interestingly, competitive targeted pricing rewards the 'right' fi rms with 'right' strategies. The conventional wisdom is that price discrimination benefi ts monopolistic fi rms who are deft enough to exploit their market power. In contrast, competitive targeted pricing forces competing fi rms to contest for, potentially, all consumers. Only the fi rms that have earned customer liking and command customer loyalty will have the upper hand in winning individual contests and hence benefi t from targeted pricing. This cannot help but encourage fi rms to become more customer and market oriented in the long run.
These three conclusions bode well for the future of competitive targeted pricing. This means that the literature also needs to move forward to facilitate the coming of that future. On the empirical side, a pressing need is to document the benefi ts of targeted pricing to a fi rm with some actual performance data, even though from a theoretical perspective there is a compelling logic for such benefi ts to exist. On the theory side, much research is still needed to understand how targeted pricing may change and interact with other decisions in the marketing mix.
